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I .  E x E C U t I V E  S U M M A r y
By Phillip Carter
After more than a decade of war, the nation will 
face an array of hard choices about how to best 
uphold its promise to the veterans and military 
community. Now that President Obama has been 
re-elected, his new administration will need to 
tackle crisis issues like military suicides, and 
longer-term challenges such as maintaining public 
support for veterans programs after the wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan are over. These choices will 
be made more difficult by significant downward 
pressure on spending, requiring the administration 
to make hard choices with profound implications 
for the men and women who serve us in uniform, 
and those who came before them, as well as for our 
national security.
Major shifts in the veterans and military popula-
tion will shape these choices. The active and reserve 
force has carried the burden of war for 11 years, and 
is now both more experienced and more stressed. 
The number of veterans is declining, from 22 mil-
lion today to approximately 14 million in 2036. The 
veteran population is changing significantly from 
previous generations, becoming more diverse in 
racial and gender terms. It will also include approxi-
mately 2.5 million post-9/11 combat veterans of Iraq, 
Afghanistan and other theaters. 
To better serve veterans and the military com-
munity, the second Obama administration should 
prioritize three areas. 
First, there are urgent issues facing this commu-
nity which must be addressed in ways that exceed 
the work done during the past four years, because 
veterans and military personnel continue to suffer:
•	 Military suicides, which caused more deaths 
among service members in 2012 than combat 
action in Afghanistan. 
•	 Combat stress, which affects one in five Iraq and 
Afghanistan veterans. 
•	 Veteran homelessness, which remains too high at 
67,495 veterans on the streets.
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•	 Veteran unemployment, which has decreased 
in recent years, but among post-9/11 veterans 
remains stubbornly elevated at 10 percent. 
Second, the next Obama administration must 
make substantially more progress in improving 
key aspects of the federal government’s service to 
the veterans and military community. Primary 
among these, the next Obama team must arrest 
and reverse the growth of the claims backlog at 
the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), where 
66 percent of claims have been pending for more 
than 125 days. In addition, the Department of 
Defense (DOD) and VA must improve access 
to services and benefits, which in many ways is 
inextricably linked with the claims backlog. DOD, 
VA and other agencies must also improve their 
coordination and interoperability to better allocate 
resources and fill gaps. 
Third, the next administration must do these 
things in a different political and operational 
environment, with the wars receding from public 
consciousness. Admiral Michael Mullen, former 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has spoken 
frequently and eloquently about the civilian “sea of 
goodwill” towards the veterans and military com-
munity. However, as the wars fade, the potential 
exists for this sea to become an ocean of apathy. In 
its second term, the Obama administration must 
continue and expand efforts like Joining Forces 
and other initiatives that bridge the civil-military 
divide. At the same time, as the veterans popula-
tion continues to change, the next administration 
must plan for the long-term future of this commu-
nity, and develop a sustainable strategy for serving 
veterans and military families that will endure for 
decades to come. 
America’s obligations to its veterans and military 
community will continue long after the current 
wars end. This report recommends a deliberate, 
consultative, inclusive policymaking process that 
will help the next Obama administration to iden-
tify key issues in this area, and engage partners in 
developing and implementing sustainable policies 
to serve this community as well as it has served us.
Admiral Michael Mullen, 
former Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, has spoken 
frequently and eloquently 
about the civilian “sea of 
goodwill” towards the veterans 
and military community. 
However, as the wars fade, the 
potential exists for this sea to 
become an ocean of apathy.
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I I .  I N t r o d U C t I o N
During the past 11 years of war, the U.S. govern-
ment has spent more than $2 trillion on military 
personnel and veterans.1 This figure represents the 
true total cost of recruiting, training, health care, 
support and payroll for America’s military family 
– the 2.5 million Americans who serve in uniform 
today, and the 22 million veterans who have served 
before them.2 It includes both the amounts spent 
by the Department of Defense (DOD) and the 
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), as well as 
smaller amounts spent by other federal agencies, 
state and local agencies, and community organiza-
tions. This is the human cost of national security, 
and the amount is likely to rise as the nation con-
tinues to uphold its promise to veterans for decades 
to come.3 
This tremendous amount of national treasure has 
supported the nation’s military during its longest 
wars, and the nation’s veterans community dur-
ing a time of tremendous change. However, the 
Iraq war has ended, and the Afghanistan war has 
entered its final phase, with its end planned for 
2014. The country is entering an age of fiscal aus-
terity where the political tolerance for government 
spending beyond America’s means appears to be 
waning, especially given that the national debt now 
totals more than $16 trillion. The second Obama 
administration will be faced with hard choices 
about funding for veterans and military personnel, 
and its decisions will profoundly impact America’s 
veterans and military community. These choices 
could also have a broader effect on U.S. national 
security, affecting recruiting, retention and readi-
ness, as well as the aggregate amount of money 
available for other military priorities such as pro-
curement and operations. This report examines the 
issues affecting the veterans and military commu-
nity and recommends to the next Obama team a 
deliberate approach to engagement and policymak-
ing that serves this community as well as they have 
served the nation. 
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I I I .  B AC kg r o U N d
The next Obama administration must consider the 
complex fiscal, demographic and combat-related 
factors that distinguish U.S. military service dur-
ing the past decade, and are affecting the broader 
veterans population as well. These factors include 
many long-term trends which, if not planned for, 
could create gaps in the nation’s support to its vet-
erans and military community.
The fiscal Picture
Between 2002 and 2012, the cost of military per-
sonnel (measured in constant dollars)4 increased 
by 46 percent, even as the total number of military 
personnel remained relatively constant. In Fiscal 
Year (FY) 2002, the DOD budgeted $108.8 billion 
(in 2012 dollars) for personnel costs,5 and $22 bil-
lion for the defense health program.6 Eleven years 
later, in FY 2012, DOD budgeted $158.5 billion 
for direct personnel costs, including $147.2 billion 
in base appropriations7 and $11.3 billion in war-
related appropriations for overseas contingency 
operations.8 The Pentagon budgeted an additional 
$33.7 billion for the defense health program in FY 
2012, including approximately $1.2 billion related 
to overseas contingency operations. 
During the same period, VA funding (measured 
in constant dollars) rose 95 percent. In 2002, the 
VA budgeted $64.9 billion (in 2012 dollars) for all 
of its operations, including $28.8 billion for health 
programs and $36.4 billion for benefits programs. 
In FY 2012, the VA’s budget totaled $127 billion for 
its operations, including $65.7 billion for veterans 
benefits programs, $54 billion for veterans health 
programs, and the remainder split among agency 
information technology, construction, benefits 
administration and other agency functions. 
During this time, the end strengths of the Army 
and Marine Corps both grew by 17 percent.9 In 
addition to the increased size of the ground forces, 
the Pentagon has relied heavily on reservists 
during the past 11 years of war, mobilizing 857,669 
individual reservists (some for multiple tours) since 
9/11.10 Concurrently, military pay and benefits 
have increased steadily during this period, making 
each individual service member more costly. Even 
with the Iraq war over, and the U.S. presence in 
Afghanistan winding down, the Pentagon projects 
that it will not reduce the force below pre-9/11 
levels until 2017 (or beyond).11
Budget increases at the VA reflect a number of 
factors, including the rising cost of medical care 
nationwide, a surge in demand for VA services and 
claims for disability payments and new benefits, 
such as the post-9/11 G.I. Bill, which accounted for 
$8.1 billion in VA spending in 2011 alone.12 The 
surge in demand for VA services has come both 
from older veterans,13 including those with new eli-
gibility for claims because of VA policy changes,14 
and from younger veterans, whose claims for VA 
benefits and demand for VA services have exceeded 
expectations (both in numbers and complexity), 
and have steadily risen since the start of the wars.15 
Going forward, considerable fiscal uncertainty 
looms for the Pentagon, which could have significant 
impact on veterans and military personnel. First, it 
is unclear how DOD would be affected by seques-
tration if the $500 billion in automatic defense cuts 
occur as currently scheduled on January 2, 2013. 
President Barack Obama notified Congress in July 
2012 that he was exempting military personnel 
accounts from sequestration, although it currently 
appears that other accounts such as operations and 
maintenance will be subject to sequestration if it 
occurs.16 Accordingly, military personnel may see 
their pay and benefits protected from cuts if seques-
tration goes into effect, but could see significant 
cuts in support programs funded through other 
accounts. Military personnel may also be affected by 
the end of combat operations in Afghanistan since 
some of these funds from supplemental appro-
priations tied to this war went to support military 
personnel and their families.
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Budget for Military Personnel, FY 2002 - FY 2012 
Personnel Costs* 
Source:	  Budget	  data	  from	  FY	  2005	  -­‐	  FY	  2013	  Na9onal	  Defense	  Budget	  Es9mates.	  
	  
*	  Personnel	  Costs	  are	  equal	  to	  the	  sum	  of	  the	  total	  DOD	  Military	  Personnel	  Account	  and	  the	  Defense	  Health	  
Program.	  Amounts	  are	  in	  terms	  of	  budget	  authority	  and	  are	  inﬂa9on	  adjusted	  to	  be	  in	  FY	  2012	  dollar	  terms.	  
Inﬂa9on	  calcula9ons	  were	  made	  using	  the	  historical	  tables	  from	  the	  Oﬃce	  of	  Management	  and	  Budget.	  
Fiscal year
Note: For the purpose of this report, personnel costs are equal to the sum of the total DOD Military Personnel Account and the Defense Health Program. Amounts are 
in terms of budget authority and are inflation adjusted to be in FY 2012 dollar terms. Inflation calculations were made using the historical tables from the Office of 
Management and Budget.
Source: Budget data from FY 2005 - FY 2013 National Defense Budget Estima es.
figUre 1: deParTmenT of defense bUdgeT for miliTary Personnel, fisCal years 2002-2012
Unlike the budget for DOD, the VA budget will 
likely remain steady during the next few years. 
Because the VA is exempt from the FY 2013 
sequestration cuts, its programs will not be affected 
by the cuts that will affect most other agencies if 
Congress and the president fail to reach a deal by 
the January 2013 deadline.17 Second, the VA ben-
efits from “advance appropriations,” under which 
some of its operations (primarily medical benefits 
and services) are funded two years at a time by 
Congress, which reduces the uncertainty in the VA 
budget cycle. Further, the majority of VA spend-
ing goes directly to veterans via benefits payments 
which are fixed as a matter of law and agency 
regulations.
The military since 9/11
The U.S. military managed the manpower needs 
of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars by stretching its 
existing force to meet an unprecedented schedule 
of multiple, extended deployments, adding tens of 
thousands of new troops and reservists at times, and 
relying heavily on contractors for as much as half 
of its force in Iraq and Afghanistan.18 Despite the 
length and intensity of the post-9/11 wars, neither 
the nation nor the military fully mobilized for these 
conflicts. The military did not quickly increase its 
end strength, mobilize its entire reserves or turn 
to conscription to build or sustain the forces it sent 
to Iraq and Afghanistan. Eventually, Congress did 
increase the end strength of the Army and Marine 
Corps by tens of thousands of personnel, but these 
increases did not reach their peak until 2010, long 
after the decisive moments in Iraq and in the middle 
of the surge in Afghanistan. Although the military 
experienced considerable turnover during this time, 
the overall force levels remained largely constant, as 
shown in Figures 2 and 3. 
As of July 31, 2012, the U.S. military had deployed 
2,453,036 individual service members for over-
seas contingency operations since 9/11, primarily 
to Iraq and Afghanistan, but also to places such as 
the Philippines, Guantanamo Bay and the Horn of 
Africa.19 Although this number roughly equals the 
total size of the active and reserve military, it does not 
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Source: These figures are based on the authorized end strength of each service as set by Congress in the National Defense Authorization Act for that particular 
fiscal year.
figUre 2: aCTive ComPonenT end sTrengTh, fisCal year 2002-2012
20
12
veterans population. In 2000, the average veteran 
was 57 years old; in 2009, the VA estimated the 
average veteran to be 62 years old.23 The majority 
of veterans served prior to 1973, when conscrip-
tion filled the military with millions of draft-aged 
men. Based on the makeup of today’s military and 
its actuarial data about today’s veterans popula-
tion, the VA projects that the number of veterans 
will steadily decline to approximately 14 million in 
2036.24 The number of Latino, African-American 
and Asian veterans is increasing substantially, 
reflecting the military’s prominent role in provid-
ing equal employment opportunity and a pathway 
to citizenship.25 Today’s veterans population also 
includes more women; more than 400,000 women 
have served since 9/11, more than all of the female 
veteran cohorts since World War II combined.26
mean that every member of the military has deployed 
once. The burden of these deployments has not been 
spread evenly across the force, with approximately 
57 percent of current military personnel having 
deployed at least once, all while the military contin-
ued to recruit new troops and discharge old ones.20
veterans since 9/11
The U.S. veterans population has also changed 
considerably in the past 11 years, becoming older, 
more diverse and more diffuse. The total number 
of U.S. veterans continued to steadily decline over 
this period. The decennial census counted 28.5 
million veterans living in the United States in 
1980; 27.5 million veterans in 1990; and 26.4 mil-
lion in 2000.21 In 2010, the VA projected that the 
veterans population had shrunk to 22.7 million.22 
Much of this decline is due to the aging of the U.S. 
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bases27 vulnerable to mortar fire and suicide 
attack; and support operations to all of the above 
– have combined to create a unique experience 
for Iraq and Afghanistan veterans. IEDs, the 
signature weapon of U.S. enemies in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, have produced tens of thousands of 
casualties, ranging from obvious wounds such as 
traumatic amputation from shrapnel to hidden 
wounds such as traumatic brain injury caused by 
concussive blasts. Many of those wounded might 
have died in previous wars, but due to a combi-
nation of better body armor, rapid evacuation 
and state-of-the-art military medicine, they now 
survive.28 The decisions to fight these wars with 
a relatively small active and reserve force, and 
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figUre 3: reserve ComPonenT end sTrengTh, fisCal year 2002 - 2012
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The operational environment’s effects  
on veterans
Those who have served since 9/11 represent a new 
kind of American veteran; their experiences of war, 
and both the challenges and opportunities they 
face moving forward, are in many ways unique. 
This requires a new approach to veterans policy.
The combat operations of the past 11 years – 
including combat operations in cities, mountains, 
wetlands and other terrain; convoy operations 
threatened by improvised explosive devices 
(IEDs); difficult counterinsurgency operations 
among civilians and combatants of shifting loyal-
ties; sustained operations on forward operating 
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to utilize a unit rotation model rather than the 
individual rotation system used in Vietnam, have 
led to multiple combat deployments for many 
troops, particularly within the Army and Marine 
Corps and the special operations community 
(although the unit rotation model has argu-
ably produced benefits too, such as greater unit 
cohesion and effectiveness in combat). Today’s 
military includes more married personnel and 
parents than during previous conflicts. Today’s 
combat veterans also enjoyed greater connectiv-
ity with their loved ones while deployed than ever 
before, thanks to ubiquitous internet connec-
tions in Iraq and Afghanistan which facilitated 
near-constant contact via email, phone and video-
teleconferencing programs like Skype. However, 
the strain of these deployments, and military 
service generally, has also taken a toll on military 
families and children.29 Deployment stress has 
affected many veterans as well, with some studies 
indicating that as many as 20 percent of Iraq and 
Afghanistan veterans redeployed with symptoms 
of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) or major 
depression.30 
These trends are translating into historic num-
bers of new veterans seeking VA support.31 Of the 
1,478,370 veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan who 
have been discharged by the military to date, 54 
percent have utilized VA health care since 2002, 
and of these veterans, 62 percent have utilized such 
care in the past year, far higher than historical 
rates of VA health care utilization by veterans.32 
The two most common diagnoses among post-9/11 
VA patients were musculoskeletal system connec-
tive tissue disease (57 percent) and mental disorder 
(54 percent).33 In addition to these high utilization 
rates, post-9/11 veterans are submitting claims 
which are considerably more complex than previ-
ous generations, including twice as many issues per 
claim as the generation of Vietnam veterans.34 
Fiscal year
Note: Amounts are in terms of budget authority and are inflation adjusted to be in FY 2012 dollar terms. Inflation calculations were made using the historical tables 
from the Office of Management and Budget.
Source: Budget data from Department of Veterans Affairs FY 2013 Annual Budget Submission. Population data from National Center for Veterans Analysis and 
Statistics, Veteran Population Model (VetPop2007). 
figUre 4: deParTmenT of veTerans affairs bUdgeT and The veTeran PoPUlaTion,  
fisCal year 2002-2012
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I V.  I S S U E S  FAC I N g  t h E  S E Co N d 
o B A M A  A d M I N I S t r At I o N
The past 11 years of conflict and change have cre-
ated profound stress for America’s veterans and 
military communities alike, as well as the agen-
cies and organizations that serve them or have 
equities in their wellness. The most pressing of 
these issues fall into three categories: immediate 
challenges that must be addressed to alleviate suf-
fering; operational improvements to the way the 
U.S. government serves the veterans and military 
community; and strategic issues the nation must 
grapple with during the next Obama administra-
tion and beyond. This report cannot recommend 
solutions to all of these issues; instead, it suggests a 
policy framework that will enable the new Obama 
team to comprehensively address these challenges. 
immediate Challenges
President Obama will need to address many urgent 
issues facing the military and veterans community. 
While most veterans reintegrate successfully after 
service, and many thrive, some do not. Some veter-
ans are suffering greatly – and in some cases, dying 
– and the next administration has a duty to do all 
it reasonably can to address their urgent needs.
sUiCides
The number of military community suicides con-
tinues to grow; the next administration must do 
more to halt and reverse this trend. In 2012, more 
active duty and reserve service members have killed 
themselves than have been killed in combat action 
in Afghanistan, with at least 341 potential suicides 
among active and reserve personnel from all four 
services.35 Overall, 18 veterans die by suicide every 
day.36 One recent study found that veteran status 
nearly doubles a person’s overall risk for suicide, 
and that the suicide rate among 17 to 24-year-old 
veterans is nearly four times greater than their civil-
ian peers.37 Suicides have claimed nearly as many 
U.S. military lives since 9/11 as improvised explosive 
devices, with approximately 3,100 deaths from IEDs, 
and at least 3,000 military suicides.38 Despite the fact 
that all four services, the Pentagon and the VA have 
made this issue a priority, the numbers of military 
suicides continue to grow.
As CNAS’ October 2011 policy brief on military 
suicides39 made clear, there is no simple, single 
solution to military suicides. Each case involves 
different factors, and although there are important 
common attributes, the diversity of individual 
suicides defies the approach embraced by the 
Pentagon and VA to date. We still know too little 
about what causes suicides, and specifically about 
what causes suicides within the military and veter-
ans population, to know how best to stop it.
The VA and DOD must therefore invest more in 
research to better understand the causes of suicide 
and the relationships between suicide and service, 
and to develop a base of data to support evi-
dence-based actions to combat suicide among all 
veterans. In the active military, where the problem 
seems most acute, senior military and civilian lead-
ers must also increase their personal involvement 
with this issue, commensurate with the toll sui-
cides are taking on the force. This emphasis should 
increase as the military transitions to a peacetime 
force, and from fighting the current war to prepar-
ing for the next one. In years to come, the military 
must treat individual service member mental 
health as a critical component of readiness that 
is just as important as the readiness of its major 
weapons systems. 
CombaT sTress
Approximately one in five Iraq and Afghanistan 
veterans come home with symptoms associ-
ated with combat stress; the same number report 
experiencing a possible traumatic brain injury 
during their combat tours.40 There is broad, quiet 
consensus regarding the likely links between 
combat stress and traumatic brain injury, and also 
consensus among military leaders, clinicians and 
researchers that the subject requires a great deal 
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more study.41 Of the 834,463 Iraq and Afghanistan 
veterans seen by the VA since 2002, 444,505 (53.2 
percent) have been diagnosed with mental health 
issues including PTSD, depression and substance 
abuse. Of these, 239,094 (53.8 percent) have been 
diagnosed with PTSD, the single largest mental 
health diagnosis.42 While these veterans specifi-
cally may not be a representative sample of all 
post-9/11 veterans, it is nevertheless significant that 
such large numbers demonstrate sustained mental 
health symptoms, and are now seeking VA care for 
these invisible wounds of war in numbers not seen 
since the Vietnam War.
Both DOD and the VA have spent billions of dol-
lars on research, improved facilities and additional 
staff to treat mental health issues among veterans 
and military personnel. DOD has worked hard to 
reduce the stigma associated with combat stress, 
including requiring mandatory post-deployment 
mental health screenings and adjusting the mili-
tary security clearance process so that troops who 
seek counseling for combat stress are not penal-
ized. The services have also implemented better 
screening processes during recruitment, and new 
wellness systems like “Comprehensive Soldier 
Fitness,” to improve the overall mental health 
of the force. And DOD recently launched a $100 
million research effort, together with the VA, to 
fund two new academic consortia aimed at better 
understanding and treating PTSD and traumatic 
brain injury.43 All of these measures have helped 
the force weather the past 11 years of conflict, and 
in many ways grow more resilient. And yet the 
military continues to struggle here, initially in 
recognizing the magnitude of the post-9/11 men-
tal health concerns among personnel, and then in 
deploying its vast resources adequately or effec-
tively in response. 
The VA’s response has largely built upon its post-
Vietnam era framework, from which the diagnosis 
of PTSD was developed. VA clinicians then led the 
way with group therapy, storefront clinics known 
as Vet Centers and peer counselors to reach a 
generation struggling with combat stress.44 Today, 
however, despite its vast resources, like DOD, the 
VA struggles to serve all of the veterans seeking 
treatment for mental health issues. This is partly 
due to the claims backlog, discussed more fully 
below. Veterans with claims pending may not be 
able to access care until the VA decides they have 
a service-connected mental health issue requiring 
treatment. Yet, for many claimants, the wait for 
adjudication can be more than a year.45 Veterans 
must also deal with appointment wait times that 
can, depending on the facility, stretch into weeks 
or months. Although the VA has worked hard 
to further open its Vet Centers and community-
based outpatient clinics, and develop approaches 
like telemedicine, veterans still face a shortfall of 
mental health capacity at the VA. These delays can 
have a human cost; in some tragic cases, such as 
that of Marine Corporal Clay Hunt, veterans have 
taken their own lives while waiting for benefits or 
services from the VA.46
The next Obama administration must do more 
to deliver care where it may not be reaching the 
individuals in need. Even with the largest budgets 
in history, the Army has less than its full comple-
ment of authorized psychiatrists, psychologists, 
and social workers and behavioral health nurses, 
and 16 of the VA’s 23 regions do not have enough 
mental health clinicians.47 DOD and the VA must 
address these shortfalls, hiring more clinicians 
where possible, and working with the private sector 
to fill gaps in the network of mental health services 
for veterans and military personnel. The services 
must also continue to fight the stigma associated 
with combat stress, and mental health treatment 
more broadly, to encourage veterans and military 
personnel to get the help they need. The services 
should also refine their wellness programs as the 
military transitions to peacetime over the next five 
years, and integrate its wellness programs into all 
aspects of training and military life, from boot 
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camp to discharge. Finally, the military should 
emphasize mental health fitness and readiness as 
much as other forms of personnel readiness, such 
as weapons qualification or dental care, and hold 
leaders at all levels accountable for the mental 
health and readiness of their troops. 
veTeran homelessness
Veterans are dramatically overrepresented in the 
homeless population. After decades of effort by 
the VA, other federal agencies, and state, local 
and community organizations to address veteran 
homelessness, VA Secretary Eric Shinseki set a goal 
in 2009 of ending veteran homelessness within 
five years. The 2009 national Annual Homeless 
Assessment Report counted 643,067 homeless 
people living on America’s streets; of these, the 
VA estimated there were 107,000 homeless veter-
ans on any given night.48 During the most recent 
“point in time” headcount in 2011, the VA counted 
67,495 homeless veterans using a revamped 
methodology for counting, 12 percent less than 
the previous year.49 Based on these numbers, the 
VA has made progress toward its goal. However, 
much more remains to be done, and community 
leaders and advocates generally agree that the 
remaining homeless veterans will be the most 
difficult population to help. In many cases, these 
chronically homeless veterans have been on the 
streets for more than six months, and also suffer 
from substance abuse, mental health problems or 
other severe difficulties. These veterans can only 
get off the streets with a comprehensive approach 
that includes case management, supportive hous-
ing, substance abuse treatment and employment 
assistance.  
Going forward, the VA should continue its suc-
cessful programs, including the Housing and 
Urban Development – Veterans Affairs Supportive 
Housing (HUD-VASH voucher) rental assistance 
and case management program it runs in partner-
ship with the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, the Supportive Services for Veteran 
Families (SSVF) program and the “grants and per 
diem” program it runs in partnership with numer-
ous community organizations that serve homeless 
veterans. However, the VA should study the relative 
efficacy of these programs to determine patterns 
of success, and reinforce the most successful ones. 
Current VA programs, such as HUD-VASH vouch-
ers, tend to help those most able to help themselves 
– the veterans who are most able to apply for 
assistance or get off the streets with minimal gov-
ernment help. To end veteran homelessness, the VA 
must make substantially more progress in reduc-
ing the number of chronically homeless veterans, 
something which can only be done by specifically 
targeting this population and with comprehen-
sive programs that combine case management, 
housing, treatment and employment, to help the 
neediest veterans get off the streets and on with 
their lives.
veTeran emPloymenT
According to the Department of Labor’s Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, the current unemployment rate 
for all veterans is 6.3 percent, and 10 percent for 
post-9/11 veterans. These rates are down signifi-
cantly from 7.7 percent and 12.1 percent at the 
same time last year.50 The unemployment rate for 
Chronically homeless veterans 
... can only get off the streets 
with a comprehensive 
approach that includes case 
management, supportive 
housing, substance abuse 
treatment and employment 
assistance.
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all veterans is lower than the national average, but 
the unemployment rate for newer veterans is much 
higher. Service members and veterans express great 
concern over these statistics. They report con-
tinuing difficulty with translating their skills and 
experience to the civilian job market, and difficulty 
with various stigmas in the civilian labor market 
regarding military service.51 However, it is unclear 
to what extent this disparity reflects normal dif-
ficulties associated with transition from military 
to civilian life, and disparities in qualifications 
between veterans and those who stayed behind to 
work in the labor force.
For the past four years, the Obama administra-
tion has taken a number of steps to combat veteran 
unemployment. The most significant of these have 
been the tax credits for employers who hire veter-
ans, and an aggressive push to hire more veterans 
for the federal workforce. Relatedly, the govern-
ment’s aggressive use of contracting preferences for 
veteran-owned small businesses has arguably ben-
efited veteran employees, to the extent that veteran 
business owners are more likely to hire veterans.52 
The administration has also partnered with the 
private sector in its Joining Forces initiative to get 
pledges from private companies to hire veterans, 
an effort which thus far has produced pledges to 
hire 135,000 veterans and military spouses.53 And 
DOD recently announced a major new transition 
program designed to assist separating troops with 
their reintegration into civilian society.54 The next 
Obama administration must continue these efforts, 
particularly as the war in Afghanistan winds down 
and national attention shifts away from veterans 
issues. And, should DOD implement the cuts in 
military end strength now being contemplated, the 
president should develop a strategy to address the 
transition of these hundreds of thousands of troops 
into the civilian economy.
operational and management issues
Beyond these immediate challenges, the second 
Obama administration should also address several 
operational issues, to improve the myriad ways 
the government cares for and provides services to 
America’s veterans and military community. 
dePloymenT TemPo
Many of the struggles faced by veterans and mili-
tary personnel over the past 11 years are rooted in 
the strains on the force created by the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. Multiple combat deployments, 
with little time for rest between, have created enor-
mous strain within the force. At the height of the 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the ratio of deployed 
time to home time for many ground combat units 
fell to 1:1. Even more severe ratios emerged in 
specialty units such as those in the special opera-
tions community, where service members deployed 
more frequently (but for shorter deployments) than 
their counterparts elsewhere in the force. The unit 
rotational model created problems, too. As individ-
ual soldiers moved between units, their tours and 
individual dwell time were not always aligned with 
that of their new units. 
With the end of the war in Iraq, and the reduction 
of forces in Afghanistan to 68,000 service mem-
bers as of this writing, the deployment demands 
on the U.S. military have gone down significantly 
since 2009. Consequently, for the majority of the 
military, deployment tempo has abated somewhat 
since the height of the wars. Nonetheless, it remains 
a significant issue for the Army and Marine Corps, 
especially the light infantry formations that con-
tinue to conduct combat operations in Afghanistan. 
The issue also remains of particular concern to the 
special operations community, which represents 
approximately 4 percent of the active military but 
will likely shoulder a disproportionate portion of the 
force’s future combat deployments.
In the short term, the next administration should 
monitor the military’s deployment tempo, focus-
ing particularly on the parts of the force (such as 
special operations) that will continue to deploy 
abroad after the U.S. role in Afghanistan winds 
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down. If dwell time falls back to the levels seen at 
the height of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, the 
next administration should increase the size of 
the military instead of stretching existing mili-
tary personnel past their breaking point. In the 
long term, however, the next administration must 
ensure the military is adequately sized for the 
demands placed upon it. It must heed the advice 
given by then-General, now-VA Secretary Eric 
Shinseki, in his retirement speech, when he warned 
the nation to “beware a 12-division strategy for a 
10-division army.”55 Excessively high deployment 
tempo and inadequate dwell time indicate that a 
too-small force is being asked to do too much, with 
the end result being more strain on the men and 
women being asked to carry this heavy burden. 
The next administration should use the opportu-
nity presented by the Quadrennial Defense Review 
to examine the current size of the force and its 
relationship to projected missions beyond Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and adjust the force where neces-
sary to align the nation’s military ends, ways and 
means. Solving this problem on the front end will 
do a great deal to lessen the strain on the force, and 
ultimately ease the burden of DOD and VA, which 
must care for those who bear this strain.
Claims baCklog
The enormous backlog of claims awaiting adjudica-
tion by the VA is tarnishing the VA’s brand in the 
eyes of veterans, who see this backlog as a tangible 
expression of the government’s disdain for them as 
well as the obstacle blocking their path to VA care 
and benefits.56 As of October 15, 2012, there were 
895,401 claims awaiting adjudication by the VA, of 
which 591,708 (66.1 percent) had been pending for 
more than 125 days.57 These statistics reflect a stag-
gering claims backlog that has grown steadily since 
9/11. In January 2004, the first period for which 
the VA published detailed claims figures, the VA 
had only 354,409 claims in its backlog, with only 
88,287 (24.9 percent) pending longer than 180 days, 
the VA’s timely adjudication goal at that time.58 
Older veterans from the World War II, Korea, 
Cold War, and Vietnam generations are filing 
more claims as they age, and for increasingly 
severe disabilities. These veterans account for the 
vast majority of the veterans population, as well 
as the vast majority of claims payments. Policy 
changes such as the presumptive service connec-
tion for Agent Orange-related ailments and new 
regulations for Gulf War-related ailments are also 
contributing to new claims being filed.59 
The VA is also seeing a wave of claims from 
younger veterans, including many claims of 
increasing complexity that include higher than 
average numbers of claimed disabilities. Nearly 
half of Iraq and Afghanistan veterans are filing 
claims with the VA, with each claiming eight to 
nine separate disabilities on average, as com-
pared to two to four ailments per veteran on 
average for older veterans.60 These ref lect the 
fact that, according to one DOD study, one in 
five post-9/11 combat veterans have sustained 
some degree of wound, injury or illness during 
their service.61
As of October 15, 2012, 
there were 895,401 claims 
awaiting adjudication by the 
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Taken together, these trends are contributing to an 
explosion of claims. Between 2008 and 2011, the 
number of claims filed increased 48 percent, from 
888,000 to 1.3 million annually.62 Although the VA 
has poured resources into the claims adjudication 
system, it has not kept pace with the numbers of new 
claims being filed, and so the backlog has grown. 
The problem is likely to grow worse, because these 
trends will likely continue into the foreseeable future, 
and new policy changes may increase the number 
of veterans filing claims. 63 These adjudications have 
enormous fiscal consequences; payments to veterans 
range from $127 per month for a 10 percent disability 
rating to $2,769 for a 100 percent disability rating.
Veterans, particularly those waiting for claims to 
be adjudicated, see the backlog as a growing sign of 
the VA’s dysfunction and inability to deliver timely 
benefits. Veterans advocates, including veterans 
service organizations like the American Legion 
and Disabled American Veterans,64 also condemn 
the backlog, but some also express concern that 
fixing it too hastily may result in reductions in 
accuracy, increases in appeals or sacrifices else-
where that could hurt veterans.65 Agency leaders 
at DOD and the VA see the backlog as a result of 
increased demand on their systems, and gener-
ally advocate eliminating the backlog by hiring 
more claims personnel, improving computing and 
processing systems, and improving agency opera-
tions generally, instead of more revolutionary 
approaches to eliminating the backlog.66 Political 
leaders differ on their degree of concern over the 
backlog. Although some members of Congress 
have sharply criticized the VA’s leadership for 
failing to reduce the backlog,67 Congressional over-
sight has not reduced the backlog either. 
It is clear that the VA’s operational improvements 
alone will neither bear fruit soon enough nor suf-
fice in the long run. Over the past decade, the VA’s 
benefits workforce has grown 80 percent, from 
13,500 full-time equivalent employees to 20,000 
in 2012,68 and has invested billions of dollars in 
infrastructure enhancements, with no reduction 
in the claims backlog. The next administration 
must do more to arrest the growth of backlogged 
claims and reduce the backlog in terms of abso-
lute numbers and average wait times – even as the 
number of claims filed continues to rise. Doing 
so will require continued emphasis from VA and 
DOD senior leaders, continued pressure and over-
sight from Congress, a combination of the current 
operational improvements and newer innovations 
like the I-LAB concept69 and utilization of the VA’s 
new disability questionnaires, and positive engage-
ment with veterans service organizations and other 
stakeholders who help veterans navigate the claims 
process. The VA must fix this issue, because it is 
damaging veterans’ perceptions of the VA and faith 
in its ability to deliver services.
Access to cAre
By law, every veteran who serves honorably in the 
armed forces for the period of his or her enlist-
ment is eligible for veterans benefits, including 
access to the VA’s top-notch hospital system and 
community-based outpatient clinics. However, 
because the VA does not have the resources to 
treat every eligible veteran, even with the largest 
VA budget in history, it uses a priority system to 
determine which veterans can access its excellent 
health care system, based on a veteran’s disabili-
ties, medical needs and income. The dividing line 
between the two lowest priority groups, 7 and 8, 
is a “means test” that allocates care to the neediest 
of veterans.70 Since 2003, VA health care has been 
effectively closed to veterans whose incomes exceed 
the means test if they do not have a service-con-
nected disability. Because the VA remains unable 
to treat all eligible veterans, it will likely continue 
to use the priority group system to ration medical 
care to those veterans the VA deems most deserv-
ing of care, and continue to exclude low-priority 
veterans from its system. 
In addition to problems of rationing, the VA must 
innovate new ways to deliver care to a smaller, more 
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diffuse veterans population. Although some veter-
ans and former military personnel cluster around 
military bases, the majority of veterans do not, 
and many do not reside near one of the VA’s major 
hospitals. Over the past decade, the VA has worked 
to improve access to care for rural veterans and oth-
ers, but this remains a major issue for the veterans 
community. This issue will likely become more 
significant during the next 10 to 20 years, as the 
veterans population shrinks and diffuses further. 
Over the next several years, the VA should redouble 
its efforts to serve veterans who do not live near its 
facilities, including approaches such as telemedicine 
and the use of public-private partnerships to extend 
the VA network to provide care in places where the 
VA does not have a physical presence. 
imProving The inTeragenCy sysTem  
for veTerans and miliTary Personnel
The broad interagency structure serving veterans and 
military personnel must continue to become both 
more efficient and effective, through better coordina-
tion, more interoperability and potential realignment 
of agency functions. Within this system, DOD has 
responsibility for active and reserve military per-
sonnel (and to some extent, their families); the VA 
cares for discharged military personnel; the Labor 
Department addresses issues of veterans employ-
ment; and the Department of Health and Human 
Services works with the VA to coordinate Medicare 
for veterans. Other agencies play a part too, such as 
the Justice Department enforcing statutes like the 
Servicemembers’ Civil Relief Act. The White House 
coordinates these efforts through the budget pro-
cesses run by the Office of Management and Budget 
and the policy processes led by the Domestic Policy 
Council and National Security Council. 
However, the interagency system for veterans and 
military personnel pales in comparison to that which 
exists for other aspects of national security policy, 
with few permanent structures to coordinate policy 
and activity across departments. This is a significant 
gap, particularly given the size of the budgets involved 
in this area: the U.S. military spends a plurality of 
its budget on military personnel and related costs, 
and the requested FY 2013 VA budget ($140 billion) 
is larger than that of the State Department, the U.S. 
Agency for International Development and the intel-
ligence community combined.71 Recent interagency 
efforts, such as the White House’s Joining Forces 
initiative and President Obama’s August 2012 execu-
tive order regarding military mental health issues,72 
have helped build the interagency policy commu-
nity in this area. But there are still gaps that present 
opportunities for increased efficiency and effective-
ness. For example, the Corporation for National and 
Community Service, with over 80,000 AmeriCorps 
members and 350,000 Senior Corps volunteers 
nation-wide, has been directed by Congress to work 
with the VA to provide services to veterans and 
military families under the auspices of the 2009 Serve 
America Act.73 However, a coordinated interagency 
effort could better direct these resources to the places 
where the need is most acute, allowing the veterans 
and military community to potentially leverage tens 
The U.S. military spends 
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on military personnel and 
related costs, and the FY 2013 
VA budget ($140 billion) is 
larger than that of the State 
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of thousands of community volunteers. The next 
administration should invest additional resources to 
strengthen and institutionalize interagency policy-
making and cooperation in this space, in order to 
effectively allocate resources and to better coordinate 
agency activities to eliminate gaps or redundancies.
The next Obama administration should also 
continue efforts to make these agencies more 
interoperable. Each federal agency serving veter-
ans and military personnel uses its own system to 
collect, store and use data, and these systems often 
do not mesh neatly with each other. These interop-
erability problems create friction for veterans and 
agencies alike, including poor outcomes for indi-
vidual veterans and service members, and waste 
critical agency resources that could be better spent 
elsewhere. The two best examples of this are the 
joint DOD-VA medical evaluation processes and the 
proposed joint DOD-VA virtual lifetime electronic 
record. Both programs have enormous potential; if 
successful, these programs would lay the foundation 
for the seamless transition of services from DOD to 
the VA as personnel leave the service. Unfortunately, 
both programs have been plagued by problems of 
design, execution and oversight.74 The next admin-
istration must make interoperability a priority, 
particularly for programs such as transition assis-
tance, which cut across agency lines.
Finally, the next Obama team should consider 
whether it has the proper agency structure in place 
to meet the needs of veterans and military person-
nel. A wide array of federal agencies support this 
community, and their work is complimented by 
a rich patchwork of public and private actors at 
the state, local and community level. However, 
the allocation of responsibilities among these 
agencies and organizations reflects history and 
funding more than system logic. It is not clear, 
for instance, why the Department of Labor runs 
veterans employment programs, instead of having 
those programs concentrated in the VA. Similarly, 
it is unclear why DOD retains responsibility for 
military retirees’ health care, instead of having that 
mission pass to the VA, as well. Although other 
parts of the national security community have 
gone through successive waves of major reorga-
nization,75 the veterans and military manpower 
agencies have not evolved to the same degree, 
which harms the efficiency and effectiveness of 
the entire structure serving this community. The 
next administration should develop a 21st century 
structure for the veterans and military community, 
one which rationalizes both the horizontal division 
of labor among federal agencies and the vertical 
division of labor among the federal government 
and state, local and community organizations.
strategic and Policy issues
In addition to these near term issues, the next 
Obama administration will need to grapple with 
strategic questions about the sustainability of 
veterans and military personnel programs, civil-
military relations and how to plan for the future 
veterans population.
sUsTaining The naTional CommiTmenT  
To veTerans and miliTary Personnel
Throughout the past 11 years of war, public sup-
port for the military, and for veterans who have 
left the service, has remained extremely high. This 
widespread support has translated into a nearly 
limitless (and politically untouchable) expansion 
Although other parts of the 
national security community 
have gone through successive 
waves of major reorganization, 
the veterans and military 
manpower agencies have not 
evolved to the same degree.
|  21
personnel costs for the active force, meaning that 
the Pentagon will spend more on former troops 
than on current ones.77 Similarly, the VA’s spending 
will continue to grow at a record pace if the current 
trends for claims and medical utilization continue. 
Taken together, the costs of recruiting, train-
ing, paying, supporting and caring for military 
personnel and veterans are rapidly becoming the 
largest part of the nation’s national security bud-
get, even as the numbers of troops on active duty 
and veterans in society decline. These concerns 
about sustaining the national social contract with 
veterans and military personnel will only grow as 
the nation moves into an era of fiscal austerity. The 
America’s national obligation to 
veterans and military personnel 
has evolved considerably since 
the nation’s founding, often dur-
ing or after each major period of 
conflict.78 For much of the 18th and 
19th century, the federal govern-
ment paid only meager pensions 
to disabled and destitute veterans, 
and sometimes to their widows or 
dependents as well. during and af-
ter the Civil War, veterans benefits 
expanded greatly to cover service 
in peacetime as well as wartime, 
provide greater pension benefits 
and to include benefits such 
as burial and land grants. After 
World War I, Congress created the 
Veterans Bureau (which eventually 
became the VA) to bring together 
a number of different veterans 
programs, which had grown to in-
clude vocational retraining, medi-
cal care, housing, compensation 
and pension programs. during 
and immediately after World War 
II, veterans programs expanded 
even further, with educational 
benefits, unemployment benefits 
and home loan guarantees, in 
addition to the existing disability 
compensation and pension sys-
tems. the modern social contract 
between America and its veterans 
emerged during this time, result-
ing from a confluence of factors 
including the massive number of 
wartime and peacetime veterans, 
the existence of a large standing 
peacetime military (manned with 
conscription), a relatively wealthy 
federal government and a national 
political attitude that favored giv-
ing benefits to veterans. 79
At the end of the Vietnam War, 
President richard Nixon ended 
conscription and launched the 
all-volunteer force. this marked 
a dramatic paradigm shift from a 
conscripted force in which veter-
ans benefits were earned through 
service to a recruited force in 
which benefits would now be 
used as a way to attract and retain 
service members. 80 Military pay 
and benefits evolved to enable 
the military to compete for talent 
with the private sector and retain 
personnel for longer periods of 
service.  Benefits such as the g.I. 
Bill became part of the enlistment 
package offered by recruiters, with 
eligibility tailored to meet the 
government’s recruiting require-
ments, instead of being avail-
able to all veterans.  the military 
changed too, evolving into a more 
professionalized, longer serving, 
better educated and older force, 
and one in which 55 percent of the 
force is married, and 40 percent 
have two or more children.81 
however, despite these changes in 
the military, the VA’s benefits and 
services systems remained largely 
the same, continuing to reflect the 
policies and principles adopted 
after World War II. 
veterans benefits Throughout american history
of programs for veterans and military personnel. 
More dollars are being spent per veteran now than 
ever before. Notwithstanding this broad popular 
support, however, there is now bipartisan concern 
over whether the current system of pay, benefits 
and services for veterans and military personnel is 
sustainable.76 On the military side, personnel costs 
are the fastest growing segment of the Pentagon 
budget, squeezing out other segments such as pro-
curement of new weapons systems, and operations 
and maintenance. By 2014, the costs of military 
benefits, such as retirement pay, post-service 
medical care for retirees (Tricare for Life), G.I. Bill 
benefits, and housing benefits will overtake direct 
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next Obama administration will need to grapple 
with the question of whether and how to sustain 
these commitments, and rationalize them in the 
broader context of the national security budget and 
other demands on the national treasury.
addressing The Civil-miliTary divide
The number of veterans in America is declining in 
absolute numbers and as a percentage of the popu-
lation. Across the nation, the numbers of veterans 
serving in leadership positions in Congress, the 
judiciary and the executive ranks of business are 
declining, too. Although the burden of military 
service during the past 11 years has been heavy, 
it has not been borne by a broad cross-section of 
society. Fewer Americans have a personal connec-
tion to the military than at any time since World 
War II. Society has not been asked to contribute in 
any significant way – greater taxes, conservation, 
or public service in other forms – to the recent 
war efforts. Indeed, America’s engagement with its 
veterans often seems to be limited to handshakes 
and yellow ribbons.82 These gestures are appreci-
ated, and are a welcome change from the treatment 
that greeted the Vietnam generation.83 And yet, 
despite these gestures, veterans today still struggle 
in society, impeded at times by stigmas related to 
their service and societal perceptions of veterans as 
damaged, fragile, volatile or different. The military 
has grown increasingly insular since conscription 
ended, setting itself apart from society through 
geography and culture. 
Within this field, the largest question for the 
veterans and military community is what will 
happen after 2014, when the Afghanistan war 
ends and the post-9/11 wars begin to fade from 
public consciousness. Admiral Michael Mullen, 
former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
spoke frequently and eloquently about the civil-
ian “sea of goodwill” towards the veterans and 
military community.84 However, as the wars grow 
more distant, this sea could become an ocean 
of apathy. As previously noted by CNAS experts 
and others, the implications for national security 
and social welfare alike are enormous. The next 
Obama administration must work hard to ensure 
public attention remains fixed on the issues 
facing the veterans and military community. In 
doing so, it should leverage proven partners in 
the field, such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
which currently supports the White House’s 
Joining Forces initiative, and federal agencies like 
the Corporation for National and Community 
Service, which currently fields AmeriCorps 
members across the country to support veterans 
and military families.85 In many ways, the hard-
est and most costly work of caring for veterans 
lies ahead, in the decades when today’s veterans 
age, and increasingly rely on the VA and other 
agencies for support. If this nation is to uphold its 
promise to today’s veterans in decades to come, 
the next administration will need to build public 
support for veterans that lasts after the trumpets 
of war fade. 
Planning for fUTUre generaTions  
of veTerans
A tectonic shift is underway in the American vet-
erans community as the largest veterans cohorts in 
American history grows smaller. If current trends 
continue, the VA’s actuarial data predicts that the 
veterans population will steadily decline from 22 
million today to 14 million in 2036, at which point 
the youngest Vietnam veterans will be 82 years old 
and the youngest veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan 
will be in their early 50s. The future veterans 
population will also have a vastly different charac-
ter – it will be even more diverse in terms of racial, 
ethnicity and gender, as well as more geographi-
cally dispersed. If current utilization statistics are 
any guide, veterans of the current wars will rely 
more heavily on the VA than previous cohorts, fil-
ing more claims for benefits and utilizing more VA 
services over their lifetimes.
The next administration must help the VA and 
other federal agencies prepare for this future 
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reality. The VA’s policy office already does extensive 
planning in this area, leveraging the rich data held 
by the VA about its current population. And the 
VA has some initiatives underway, like its Strategic 
Capital Investment Planning process, which are 
designed to align agency resources to meet future 
challenges. However, these efforts should expand in 
scale and scope and including other agencies and 
partners as well. Based on the predicted veterans 
population changes over the next generation, the 
VA must prepare to change along with the chang-
ing veterans population, on a scale as significant 
as the change which followed World War II. Given 
the numbers of veterans, and the tremendous size 
of the VA budget, the next administration should 
make this planning a priority. It should work with 
the veterans and military community to develop 
a long-term strategic plan to align ends, ways and 
means in ways that will continue to serve future 
generations of veterans.
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V.  B U I l d I N g  A  P o l I C y  Co M M U N I t y 
to  S U P P o r t  V E t E r A N S  A N d 
M I l I tA r y  P E r S o N N E l
In addition to the specific recommendations out-
lined above, the next administration must also 
embrace an inclusive, strategic policymaking 
approach that transcends existing agencies and 
structures. This approach includes defining the 
community in sufficiently broad terms that include 
issues which cut across agencies; engaging key stake-
holders at all levels of government, and in the private 
sector; building a community of practice for veter-
ans and military personnel issues; and considering 
specific policymaking tools which have helped other 
agencies anticipate and plan for future complexity. 
defining the Community
Because so many of the issues affecting this commu-
nity transcend current agency boundaries, the next 
administration must define the veterans and mili-
tary community broadly, to facilitate an approach 
that can leverage the expertise, resources and 
capabilities of all parts of the government to address 
the pressing issues described above. To take one 
example, military suicides are a problem for active 
duty service members, reservists, veterans, as well as 
their families, communities, employers and others. 
Although individual agencies may focus on a par-
ticular subset of this community, the administration 
should visualize it broadly, so as to find common 
solutions and build coordinated strategies in ways 
that cut across existing bureaucratic lines. In an age 
of fiscal austerity, the second Obama administra-
tion will likely be forced to seek efficiencies across 
these agencies, instead of replicating functions and 
capabilities within both DOD and VA because they 
serve different populations. 
This report defines the community to include 
active duty personnel, active reservists and mem-
bers of the ready reserve and veterans. However, 
the next Obama administration will likely face a 
series of questions about whether to include others 
in this population. Growing attention has focused 
on military families over the past 11 years, includ-
ing most significantly First Lady Michelle Obama’s 
engagement with military family issues. Given 
the large numbers of active and reserve military 
personnel with families today (as compared to 
previous generations of military personnel), the 
next Obama administration should continue to 
include military families in its strategy for serving 
the veterans and military community. 
Beyond those who actually serve in uniform and 
their families, the next administration should also 
engage a broader community of interest with equi-
ties in these issues. It would be impossible to list all 
of the groups with a stake in veterans and mili-
tary personnel issues, but four types of groups are 
particularly important. First, the nation’s veterans 
organizations, including both the Congressionally-
chartered organizations like the American Legion, 
and newer groups like Iraq and Afghanistan 
Veterans of America, must be involved in creating 
future policy for veterans and military personnel. 
Second, state and local agencies, as well as com-
munity organizations, contribute a great deal to 
veterans and military personnel; any policymak-
ing efforts in this space should include them to the 
maximum extent possible. Third, civilian busi-
nesses, particularly those with employees serving 
in the reserves or large veteran workforces, also 
have a stake in these issues, and should be included 
in discussions and policymaking in this field. 
Last, the next administration should engage the 
other government agencies that deploy person-
nel into harm’s way, so these agencies can provide 
the appropriate support to their people who serve 
as part of the nation’s “whole of government” 
approach to war in the 21st century. 
building a Policy support network
In addition to defining the community it will 
serve, the second Obama administration should 
also expand the community of policymaking and 
practice that supports the veterans and military 
|  25
community. DOD and the VA robustly collaborate 
with a number of partners now, including the vet-
erans service organizations, service organizations 
and many others. In addition, DOD maintains 
a sizable intellectual base of federally-funded 
research and development centers like the RAND 
Corporation and Institute for Defense Analyses. 
The VA, by contrast, officially supports just one 
(although it does fund studies from some oth-
ers). Similarly, DOD’s senior leadership relies on 
a robust network of advisory committees like the 
Defense Policy Board, Defense Science Board and 
Defense Business Board, to provide strategic advice 
and counsel. The VA lacks such a policymaking 
community; it does not benefit from an intellectual 
support base comparable to that enjoyed by DOD, 
despite its massive size and scope of responsibil-
ity.86 Such a community provides valuable human 
capital for DOD and its agencies, including ana-
lysts at all levels and senior civilian leaders. It also 
provides DOD with deep research and analysis 
capability that it cannot efficiently or effectively 
maintain internally. The VA would benefit greatly 
from this kind of support.
The next administration should develop a more 
robust community of policymaking and practice 
to support the VA – the nation’s second largest 
agency with a requested FY 2013 budget of $140 
billion, a workforce of 320,000 federal employ-
ees and responsibility for 22 million veterans. 
It should begin by expanding and re-launching 
the federal advisory committees serving the 
VA, and determining whether additional ones 
(such as the advisory committee on the Iraq and 
Afghanistan wars, shelved in 2009) should be 
established. In addition, as a CNAS expert sug-
gested in a November 2010 policy brief,87 the next 
administration should strongly consider creating 
high-level advisory boards for the VA, analogous to 
the Defense Policy Board, that can provide poli-
cymaking support, advice and counsel, as well as 
greater engagement with the veterans and military 
community. 
The VA should also continue to catalyze aca-
demic and policy research in this field by funding 
research centers that can support the agency and 
the broader veterans and military community. 
Two academic centers – Syracuse University’s 
Institute for Veterans and Military Families, and 
the University of Southern California’s Center for 
Innovation and Research on Veterans & Military 
Families – have been established in the past 
five years and are now generating a tremendous 
amount of expertise and capability. These centers 
should be harnessed and supported by the next 
administration, and developed into an intellectual 
base that can support the veterans and military 
community in decades to come. 
The next administration 
should develop a more robust 
community of policymaking 
and practice to support the VA 
– the nation’s second largest 
agency with a requested FY 
2013 budget of $140 billion, a 
workforce of 320,000 federal 
employees and responsibility 
for 22 million veterans.
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V I .  Co N C lU S I o N
After each era of conflict, the nation has paused to 
assess the state of its support for its veterans and 
military personnel. Following World War II, a 
commission led by retired General Omar Bradley 
(who would go on to lead the department that is 
now the VA) wrote:
The state of veterans’ affairs in the United States 
is on the whole good. After many years of trial 
and error this country has developed reasonably 
successful methods for meeting the needs of its 
veterans. . . . The veterans’ programs, however, 
are not perfect. Much remains to be done by way 
of improvements along forward-looking and 
constructive lines. The dominant problems are 
the carryover from past decades of a backward-
looking pension philosophy and our failure to 
adjust the existing veterans’ programs to funda-
mental changes in our society.88
Just as it has throughout its history, the nation 
has asked a great deal of its veterans and mili-
tary personnel during the past 11 years of war. 
America’s obligation to veterans and the broader 
military community will continue after the cur-
rent wars end, and in many ways become more 
costly as this generation of veterans comes home, 
transitions into civilian society and relies more 
upon the support provided through DOD, VA 
and other agencies. Even after the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan recede from memory, the next 
administration must maintain public attention on 
the issues facing the veterans and military com-
munity and political support for their solutions. To 
do this, President Obama must continue to exercise 
personal leadership on these issues, emphasizing 
the nation’s obligation to serve its veterans as well 
as they have served us. And the second Obama 
administration must build an enduring policy 
community and infrastructure to support the vet-
erans and military community over the next four 
years and beyond.
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